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Gender Myths that
Instrumentalise Women: 
A View from the Indian
Frontline
Srilatha Batliwala and Deepa Dhanraj
Religious fundamentalism and neo-liberal economic
reforms are converting poor grassroots women in
India into both agents and instruments in a process
of their own disempowerment. Though these forces
are not necessarily acting in concert, they are
nonetheless reconstructing both gender and other
social power relations. While we have analysed this
dynamic elsewhere (Dhanraj et al. 2002), in this
article we examine the role of certain gender myths
– or rather, myth complexes – in this process.1
Specifically, we explore the way certain gender
myths are being used to convert women –
particularly poor women – into instruments of both
the neo-liberal and fundamentalist agendas in India.
The operation of these myths is analysed in the
context of a government-initiated rural poverty
alleviation programme in southern India and the
Constitutionally-mandated reservation of seats for
women in local elected councils (panchayats).
At the outset, we wish to emphasise that we do
not offer this critical analysis as academic observers,
or deny our own participation in these processes.
Indeed, the choice of examples is guided at least
partly by the history of our own contribution, and
the involvement of colleagues whom we supported
in various ways. We have both been complicit,
through our past roles in grassroots activism,
feminist training and advocacy, in promoting various
gender myths and feminist fables that we have only
recently begun to recognise as such. Thus, it is not
our intention to point fingers or place blame. The
analysis that emerges here is the result of critical
introspection, of re-examining our own as well as
others’ past assumptions and interventions. We
believe this is a critical moment when all feminists
– whether activists, policy advocates or researchers
– must interrogate our own assumptions and
strategies, or risk becoming completely marginalised
and/or instrumentalised by the forces of resurgent
patriarchy, religious fundamentalism and neo-
liberalism.
1 Gender myth complex I
Giving poor women access to economic
resources – such as credit – leads to their
overall empowerment
This myth arose out of successful feminist efforts
to shift economic resources into women’s hands,
gain recognition for women’s roles in household
economies and support women’s leadership in local
development. Feminist efforts were of course rooted
in an understanding that economic power and
access to productive resources would weaken
traditional gender and social roles and empower
poor women to demand further change. But as these
strategies began to demonstrate the soundness of
investing in women’s entrepreneurship and
leadership, they were quickly converted into a new
development mantra: poor women are now
considered the best economic and political
investment. At the international level, the World
Bank, USAID, DFID and other bilateral and private
donors have embraced and enthusiastically
promoted the new formula. At the national level,
both central and state governments and rural banks
have begun to actively promote self-help groups
and women’s savings and credit programmes
through schemes such as Directorates of Women
and Child Development (DWCRA), the Indira
Mahila Yojana and now, Swayamsidha. The creation
of special Directors for Micro Credit and in many
state DWCRA tells its own story.
The conceptual legerdemain achieved here is
neatly summed up by Mary John. She observes that
a nationwide study like Shramshakti (National
Commission on Self-Employed Women and
Women in the Informal Sector 1988) recorded an
enormous pile of evidence of the incredible burdens
borne by poor self-employed and informal-sector
working women in India; but in the hands of neo-
liberal advocates, ‘these findings are no longer
arguments about exploitation so much as proofs of
efficiency’ (John 2004: 247, own emphasis). Poor
women are now seen as harder working, easier to
mobilise, better credit risks, more selfless because
they are concerned with their entire families and
communities, more loyal voters, the best anti-
corruption vigilantes, and the best agents to uplift
their families and communities. Obviously, many
of these statements are generally true. The mythical
dimension arises when qualities born out of
women’s struggle for survival are exploited for
political and economic ends, rather than from a
commitment to their empowerment.
In India, one of the most high-profile propagators
of this myth is the former Chief Minister of Andhra
Pradesh state, Mr Chandrababu Naidu. His affinity
for high-tech corporate management systems has
earned him the epithet “The CEO of Andhra
Pradesh” and the foremost proponent of “E-
governance”. From 1999, when Andhra Pradesh
launched an economic restructuring project under
his leadership, he decided to use rural women as
key instruments of his policies – and of his political
strategy for staying in power. In the Indian context,
such restructuring had to include a major anti-
poverty component to appease the mass of poorer
rural voters, who were unlikely to benefit from the
deregulation, improved investment incentives and
removal of bureaucratic hurdles, that facilitated the
urban affluent classes. In Mr Naidu’s case, the modus
operandi was to create government-owned NGOs
(amusingly called “GONGOs” in some quarters),
administered by elite Indian civil service officers.
Mr Naidu made it clear to both his party cadres and
government functionaries that implementation
would be through grassroots women’s groups. In
the Indian realpolitik, this signalled that the only
political constituency he was interested in building
was women, and he conflated women with “poor”,
“rural” and “community”.
Thus it was that the largest poverty alleviation
programme in the state focused entirely on rural
women: the World Bank-funded District Poverty
Initiatives Project, with a budget of 26,000 million
Indian Rupees (US$553 million, UK£333 million)
in 20 districts of the state. Headed by carefully
selected officers of the elite Indian Administrative
Service, the project begins with the identification
of all formations of women at the village level (self-
help groups, Mahila Mandals, Bhajan Mandalis).2
Simultaneously, NGOs were identified to conduct
training for the women’s groups in gender issues,
income generation activities, and financial skills
such as accounting and book-keeping.
Although the project was initially designed to
enable the women’s groups to determine and create
local projects based on their priorities (including
building community assets like drinking water
pumps), it was soon reduced to distributing loans
to individual women for income-generating
activities. Very poor women soon fell out of the net
because they could not pay the weekly contribution
required to retain membership of the self-help
group. In a short while, only women with some
stable earning capacity remained in the groups.
The project also tried to improve women’s access
to and relations with markets. For instance, women
who gathered and sold tamarind were always
swindled by middlemen who drove down purchase
rates and used falsified weights and scales. An
internet-based system was therefore introduced to
check market rates on a daily basis, in order to give
women more bargaining power. But many women
could not exercise that power since they were
heavily indebted to the buyers. The self-help group
was simply not a powerful enough structure from
which to challenge weights and measures or
purchase prices, as a cooperative or trade union
might have been – particularly since rights
awareness and strengthening the capacity for
collective struggle were not part of the organising
strategy for such groups.
The project’s community organisers also began
to press women to take multiple production loans;
and the number of hours they were working
increased dramatically – there was no other way to
keep pace with their mounting debt. But if one
converted their profits from all these enterprises
into wages, not one of them was earning even the
minimum daily wage. At a workshop on ‘Rethinking
Micro-Credit’, held at the recent World Social Forum
in Bombay, rural women from different parts of the
country spoke passionately about their multiple
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debt burdens and how repayment had increased
their workloads to inhumane levels. Yet, the project
continually cites these women as models of
entrepreneurship – not surprising since the only
indicator they use is monthly cash turnover.
Meanwhile, men in project villages have become
sullen and resentful. Women handling so much
money has become a source of humiliation; they
neither understand nor acknowledge the women’s
onerous workload, or the debt-trap which gives no
respite. Thus, apart from being overworked and
anxious about mounting interest and repayments,
women have to deal with this growing hostility –
and possibly violence – from men in the home.
But far worse is the assumption behind the
project’s strategy: once money is handed over in
the form of loans, the women are responsible for
improving their lot, and the state’s role is over. At
the same time, this munificence will earn the ruling
party rural women’s allegiance, and secure its
political future. The women’s political agency has
been reduced to the privilege of being agents,
consumers and beneficiaries of state-controlled
credit and micro-enterprise programmes, with no
other investment in improving the condition of
their daily lives. There are no investments, for
example, in providing cooking fuel, water close to
the home, or day care for younger children, so that
older daughters can go to school. Women are so
preoccupied with earning income to repay loans
that they have little time or energy to participate in
other public affairs, or organise other issues.
Ironically, this is the very same region of India
that once saw massive participation by poor women
in large-scale political movements (such as the
armed struggle in Telengana, see Sanghatana 1989;
Sen 2000: 24) for land, for minimum wages, in
protests against rise in price of basic commodities,
against the sale of country liquor that beggared
families while filling state coffers with revenue.
Now, the women of this same region are being
converted into passive instruments of the regime’s
single-point anti-poverty measure, with little or no
capacity to negotiate for a different agenda or
approach. The humiliating rout of Mr Naidu’s party
in the May 2004 state elections in Andhra Pradesh
could at least, in part, manifest women’s rejection
of his political strategy and policies, and their
attempt to reclaim political agency through the
ballot box.
This kind of narrowed focus is not unusual in
credit-focused strategies. A decade ago, staff of BRAC,
a Bangladeshi NGO famous for its very large-scale
women-focused poverty-alleviation programme,
acknowledged the same in a review of the gender
impact of their work:
The evidence suggested that participation in
BRAC’s programs had strengthened women’s
economic roles and, to some extent, increased
women’s empowerment measured in terms of
mobility, economic security, legal awareness,
decision making and freedom from violence
within the family. However, widely
acknowledged among BRAC staff was the fact
that the imperatives of credit delivery were
eclipsing the objectives of social change. (Rao,
Stuart and Kelleher 1999: 43)
Programmes to alleviate poverty are obviously
rooted in ideological frameworks. This programme
demonstrates the heavy influence of the neo-liberal
paradigm: it has been designed to ensure that people
– for which read women – participate in the
narrowest possible form of economic development
in the most apolitical and disempowering way
imaginable. As Lucy Taylor argues, the neo-liberal
agenda requires the state to keep those ‘who have
not forgotten their politicised past … busy and out
of harm’s way, distracted from wider political
considerations and submerged within the minutiae
of issues in their own backyard’ (1996: 785).
The neo-liberal agenda, Taylor suggests, requires
citizens to accept the reformed identity of the state
as facilitator, not provider, of social and individual
betterment. It also demands the twin identities of
citizen and individual – i.e. the active, socially
responsible citizen and the active, socially
responsible individual who is in charge of her own
destiny. The neo-liberal rules for the new woman
citizen, as evidenced in the Andhra Pradesh project,
are quite clear: improve your household’s economic
condition, participate in local community
development (if you have the time), help build and
run local (apolitical) institutions like the self-help
group; by then, you should have no political or
physical energy left to challenge this paradigm.
These rules sustain a sort of depoliticised activism
at the local level – one that inherently does not build
upward momentum.
Why should this concern us? Is it not enough
that poor women have gained greater access to
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productive resources? It is the experience of Gujarat
state, with some of the oldest and largest networks
of women’s credit and income-generation groups,
that challenges such complaisance. It is in this state
that totalitarian, fundamentalist, anti-poor ideologies
and their cadres, largely undisturbed and
unchallenged, have waged their violent politics at
the grassroots level. And this is also the state where
the most horrifying and organised carnage against
the Muslim minority (the worst since the partition
of India in 1947, with Muslim women being
particularly targeted) was unleashed by Hindu mobs
in early 2002.
Despite extensive grassroots-level women’s
economic empowerment programmes, mostly
operated by NGOs, and which have ostensibly
promoted a tolerant, unifying value system, neither
Muslim nor Hindu members of these networks
seem to have been aware of the approaching
carnage, or of the vicious hate campaign that we
now know was being spread for at least a year before
the pogroms (Khan 2002). In the very
neighbourhoods in which these women lived, the
aggressively fundamentalist Vishwa Hindu Parishad
had been actively mobilising women into Durga
Vahinis (women’s militias), and providing arms
training (to defend themselves against the insatiable
sexual appetite of minority men). It seems incredible
that none of this came to the attention of women
in the micro-enterprise or self-employed groups
that dot the state … unless it was because they were
so narrowly focused on their economic activities
that they never sensed the political winds blowing
through their very villages and neighbourhoods.
Or was it because the discussion of larger politics
was never included on weekly or monthly women’s
group meeting agendas?
What we are seeing is a confusing picture where
on the one hand, fundamentalist agendas are
actively mobilising women of all classes in their
movements, and on the other, the political agency
of large numbers of poor women is being dissipated
through a model of citizenship and participation
that is being promoted in a very instrumentalist
fashion by the state and its international allies. It is
frightening indeed to contemplate the fact that in
India, the only force currently interested in
empowering poor women as political actors is the
Hindu fundamentalist movement.
2 Gender myth complex II
If women gain access to political power,
they will opt for politics and policies that
promote social and gender equality,
peace and sustainable development.
Thus, quotas or other methods of
ensuring high proportions of women in
elected bodies will transform these
institutions. Women will alter the character
of political culture and the practice of
public power. (United Nations 1995)
It is not hard to understand how this fable came
into being (sometime in the 1970s, we think). Male
domination of public power and politics had led
to the destruction of life, humanity and the earth
itself. Even in so-called “liberal democracies”, the
notion of democracy itself had been reduced, as
the late Claude Ake pointed out, to a minimalist
version, where the main privilege enjoyed by
citizens is that of some protection from state power
(Ake 1996). As feminists from the North and South
began to expand and deepen their understanding
of the roots of gender discrimination, they argued
that women’s access to power and decision-making
authority in the public realm was as critical to
achieving gender equality as changing power
relations in the private sphere of households (UN
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Strategic
Objectives G.1 and G.2). Looking back, and again,
having been part of this process, we believe there
were several implicit and explicit assumptions
underlying this analysis, including:
 that the transformation of both the position and
condition of women (Young 1988) – i.e. meeting
both their practical and strategic needs – could
only be achieved and sustained in macro terms
through political change (enabling policies,
legislation and the protection and enforcement
of women’s rights)
 that women representatives in local, national and
global political bodies would advance the cause
of gender equality and women’s rights and sustain
the momentum for such change over time
 that a critical mass of women in political
institutions would also initiate policies of
development and international relations that
would advance social and economic justice and
peace, by fostering and promoting non-violent
conflict resolution, sustainable and socially just
IDS Bulletin 35.4 Repositioning Feminisms in Development
14
development, access to and protection of the
full body of human rights, and placing people
and the environment above profits
 that a critical mass of women in political
institutions would transform the very nature of
power and the practice of politics through values
of cooperation and collaboration, holding power
in trusteeship (power on behalf of, not over) and
acting with greater transparency, honesty and
public accountability. In other words, there was
a belief that women would play politics differently
and exercise power accountably.
With the wisdom of hindsight, we can see how
these assumptions reflected our then limited
understanding of citizenship, and of how citizenship
was constructed in not just gendered ways, but
through other categories of social power. We assumed
that citizenship was a fixed and bounded terrain,
rather than that ‘like power relations, citizenship
rights are not fixed, but are objects of struggle to be
defended, reinterpreted and extended’ (Meer with
Sever 2004: 2). We believed that once women had
access to political power, they would act for greater
justice and equity. The push for getting women into
politics became strong and visible in many parts of
the developed and developing world by the mid-
1970s, and by the 1990s, several European countries,
the USA, and developing countries such as India, the
Philippines, South Africa, Uganda, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico and many others had large numbers of women
in their political parties and governing institutions at
various levels. In some contexts – notably India and
South Africa – “pull” factors like quota systems were
used; in others, such as the USA and some parts of
Western Europe, “push” factors (mainly pressure from
women’s movements) worked effectively to increase
the number of women elected representatives. Over
time, feminist struggles to promote women’s greater
representation and participation in politics were
picked up and encapsulated into modules and
templates by international donor agencies and other
institutions that began to promote the new “good
governance” agenda, particularly in the South.
It would be a grave disservice to thousands of
courageous women to say that all the assumptions
about their impact on public policy, politics and
power have been belied. But the experience of the
last two decades forces us to confront some troubling
realities and recast our vision for transformation
through political power.
The most worrying phenomenon at the present
time is that the expanding space for women in politics
has been seized far more effectively by right-wing,
conservative and fundamentalist parties and agendas.
In the USA, for instance, while the Democrats boasted
of having fielded the largest number of women
candidates for both Congress and Senate, Republicans
are rapidly closing the gap. As the Gender Gap
website says, ‘several trends indicate there will be
larger gains in the future. More women are running
for office. Far more women are winning their primary
races (73 per cent of female House candidates won
their primary, up from 57 per cent in 1996 and 48
per cent in 1992). Both major parties are more actively
courting female candidates who have proven they
can wage a strong campaign. Christian fundamentalist
groups, with their close affiliation to conservative
political agendas, are the ones that have mobilised
poor and middle class grassroots American women
voters and activists on a very large scale, not the
progressive movements or parties.3
In South Asia, the huge mobilisation of women
by religious fundamentalists, including the fielding
of women political candidates, is nothing short of
frightening.4 Before the current general elections,
there were four women Chief Ministers of various
Indian state governments, the highest in post-
Independence history – and all of them were
members of the ruling Hindu nationalist party, or
its close allies. This first became evident when the
media flashed images of thousands of Hindu women
across the country joining the marches and the
symbolic carrying of construction material to the
Babri Masjid, the ancient mosque destroyed by
Hindu fundamentalist mobs in 1992, to rebuild
the Ram temple that was allegedly destroyed when
the mosque was built. The images became more
aggressive during the anti-Muslim riots in Bombay
in 1993: hundreds of Hindu women made petrol
bombs that their men then hurled on Muslim
shanties. The pinnacle, however, was reached
before, during and after the anti-Muslim pogroms
in Gujarat state in early 2002, when thousands of
Hindu women, both poor and middle class, actively
supported the attackers, joined in the looting of
Muslim shops and marched in massive numbers
in the political rallies and processions that were
held in support of the state’s fundamentalist regime.
To dismiss this phenomenon simply as a result
of false consciousness, or the instrumentalisation
of passive women by cynical and sinister leaders,
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is a grave mistake. Seen from close up, women’s
participation in these movements is far from passive
or blind, but very much through their active agency.
As we have argued elsewhere (Dhanraj et al. 2002),
the fact is that fundamentalist movements have
created a genuine political space and role for women.
They have given them the possibility of being real
political actors, an active sense of being architects
of a grand public project, of building a new society.
Regrettably, this is something which neither other
political parties, nor the labour movement, nor
progressive social movements (including feminist
women’s movements) have done on the same scale
or with the same deadly sense of purpose. It is also
unfortunate that in the current Indian scenario, the
Hindu fundamentalists are the most effective and
deliberate in deploying mass mobilisation strategies,
and have the most conscious programme of women’s
mobilisation within them.
Meanwhile, India boasts of nearly one million
elected women in its village and town councils,
thanks to the passing of the 73rd Amendment to
the Constitution of India, in which Indian feminists
had little role. This Amendment made it mandatory
for 33 per cent of all positions in local councils to
be reserved for women. There were also reservations
for Dalit and tribal men. This was brought about
by well-intentioned Gandhian advocates and
bureaucrats who envisaged a form of local
governance and decentralisation that would
transform rural India, a social revolution that could
redress centuries of marginalisation for both Dalits
and women, orchestrated by the State.
The discourse on the impact of this
unprecedented structural change, the largest scale
experiment of its kind anywhere in the world, is
rather banal for the most part. It is also quite
polarised, between gloomy stories of women’s co-
option or subversion on the one side, and cheering
protagonists on the other, who dismiss criticism or
any analysis that is less than laudatory. Both positions
are often derived from anecdotal evidence and
ideological positions, rather than a serious inquiry
into what is actually happening. There are, of course,
some large-scale and highly quantitative studies,
but these fail to capture many of the complexities
and nuances of the reality. They tell us little about
what it has meant for elected women and men from
poor castes and communities, how they are
negotiating their roles in the councils and the nature
of grassroots political culture and functioning.
What we have witnessed on the ground – as
documented in Dhanraj’s film Taking Office – is a
complex picture, where both patriarchal and
feudal/semi-feudal gender and social power relations
are simultaneously being challenged, changed,
accommodated, and modified at the same time. A
landless Dalit woman labourer is elected to and
becomes the Chairperson of a village council in
which her upper-caste landlord (or his wife) is also
an elected member. Dalit, tribal, other oppressed
caste and minority women and men elected
representatives have to negotiate a vast and
dangerous minefield of class and caste politics,
patronage networks, and affiliations, while the social
and economic bases of their lives outside the
panchayat remain unchanged. We know of elected
women who have been placed under virtual house
arrest for attempting to challenge budget allocations;
they have been beaten up, threatened, bribed and
cajoled into supporting dominant caste or class
agendas in the Councils. We find that since most
women have entered these institutions without any
kind of political or ideological training, skills or
experience – they have not been members of a
political party or cadre, for example – or have only
the limited apolitical experience of their participation
in a village self-help group, they are forced to learn
and acquire these skills in the most arduous ways
and at great cost. We have seen women devote all
their time and energy to simply learn how to steer
through the maze. Many have amazingly triumphed
over these odds and managed to deliver a few
resources to their constituency. Indeed, most of the
elected women with whom we have interacted are
far from passive puppets. They show remarkable
resilience in repeatedly trying to exercise their agency,
to fulfil their responsibilities, to flex their political
muscles, or simply to function autonomously.
A major handicap, we find, is that these women
struggle in the absence of any alternative models of
power. As Anne Marie Goetz (2003: 3, 5–6) points
out, their images of leadership and experience of the
exercise of power are gained within the
family/household, from the feudal and caste-based
social and economic structures they live in, and the
few state and non-state institutions they have
interacted with in their lives: the school, the local
government officers, and maybe rural NGOs and
development organisations. None of these are exactly
models of alternative politics, much less innovative
practitioners of power. Feminist activists have
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attempted to create these alternatives in a few
locations – but more often, women’s groups are quick
to stigmatise these elected leaders for becoming co-
opted or corrupted by the dominant political culture,
rather than supporting them to create an alternative.
Apart from celebrated examples – Indira Gandhi,
Benazir Bhutto, Margaret Thatcher, Jayalalitha, etc.
– there are growing numbers of “Women with
Moustaches”, as Latin American feminists have called
them, in politics at all levels today: hard-nosed, tough,
aggressive and sometimes corrupt women politicians.
We believe it is much too simplistic to dismiss this
as the result of male consciousness masquerading in
female bodies. Nevertheless, in a country like India,
there are very few successful elected women to serve
as mentors or models.
3 Conclusion
The above analysis of the operation of two major
gender myths seems to suggest that a larger project
is at work in India – one that is constructing and
then utilising women as particular types of social,
economic and political citizens.
The myth of women as the best anti-poverty
agents and investments, and the mass-scale creation
of women’s self-help groups, seems to be nurturing
a form of depoliticised collective action that is
completely non-threatening to the power structure
and political order. These groups, forced to focus
all their energies on their productive activities, their
loan repayments and the survival of their collective,
seem to be rendered oblivious to the
ideological/political mobilisations going on under
their very noses. Lucy Taylor’s analysis of the
reinterpretation of civil society and citizenship in
Chile in the dictatorship and post-dictatorship
years, where the ‘twin strategies of incorporation
and marginalisation’ (1996: 780) were used,
demonstrates not only how self-help groups were
the policy instruments of this agenda, but that this
strategy is not unique to India.
We are not suggesting that economic
empowerment programmes for women are either
disempowering or unmitigated failures. The successes
of micro-credit for women are well documented (see
ILO 1998) and there is little purpose in raising yet
another paean to them here. Our purpose, rather, is
to highlight the manner in which such interventions
are being designed and delivered in increasingly
disempowering ways, instrumentalising poor
women, and being distorted to serve other agendas.
On the political front, far from women
transforming politics, evidence of the reverse is
mounting. Particularly disturbing is the way in
which fundamentalist parties have fostered women’s
political participation to advance their agenda. At
the grassroots level, we are witnessing both this
kind of instrumentalisation and the marginalisation
of women elected representatives in multiple ways,
in a manner very similar to what is happening in
other parts of the world (Goetz and Hassim 2003).
As one analysis puts it, ‘the system of representation
that gives women “authority” through holding an
elective post has not transformed into actual “power”’
(Vijaylakshmi and Chandrasekhar 2001).
What is clear, however, is that the myths
regarding women’s capacity to transform both
politics and public power have been central to all
these processes. We clearly underestimated the
power of existing modes of power and politics to
corrupt, co-opt, or marginalise women, or how it
would compel or manipulate them to compromise
their goals for narrow party interests. And we failed
to address the possibility that women would be
proponents of reactionary, sexist, racist, elitist or
fundamentalist ideologies.
Thus, if we combine the mobilisations of women
by the fundamentalist agenda, the depoliticised
forms of collective action promoted by state-
sponsored micro-credit programmes, and the
subversion of the agency of elected women in
panchayats, what emerges is a deeply problematic
and bounded construct of women’s citizenship – a
construct that must be seriously analysed,
challenged, and re-framed. But this is also a serious
learning moment for feminists. We are clearly at a
historic juncture where the marginalisation of
feminist critiques and corporatisation of feminist
strategies forces us to recast our analyses and
approaches. This cannot be achieved without looking
closely at what is happening to women on the
ground. Using the lens of gender myths helps us
unearth the deeper, more fundamental processes of
restructuring power and politics that are afoot – the
ways in which resurgent patriarchy, neo-liberal
economics and fundamentalism are combining to
construct a new kind of female citizen. The challenge
now is to move towards more nuanced and
contextualised approaches that can hopefully begin
to confront and contain these formidable forces.
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Notes
1. For the purpose of this article, we are treating gender
myths as the ‘feminist insights [that] become mythologised
as they become development orthodoxy’, and feminist
fables as assumptions and analyses that informed strategies
advanced by feminists themselves. Some of the most
problematic of today’s gender myths are not single ideas
but a web of interlinking beliefs and views.
2. These are women’s clubs and the equivalent of Western
choral societies.
3. It was interesting to note, for example, that African
American women were the single largest constituency
opposed to the war on Iraq, yet have never been
significantly mobilised by any progressive movement in
the USA after the civil rights era.
4. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad has launched special training
camps for young Hindu women to act as ‘Protectors of
the Faith’, including training in the use of swords and
other weapons.
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